XXXIX. FIRST PERIOD OF THE TOKUGAWA BAKUFU; FROM THE FIRST TOKUGAWA SHOGUN, IEYASU, TO THE FOURTH, IETSUNA (1603-1680)
LEGISLATION
THE Tokugawa family having brought the whole empire under its sway, Ieyasu applied himself to legislative work with a degree of thoroughness and earnestness that far exceeded anything in the history of his predecessors. The terms of the oath of allegiance that he dictated to the feudatories after the battle of Sekigahara have been already referred to. Ten years later, that is to say, in 1611, he required all the provincial governors to subscribe this same oath, and, in 1613, he enacted a law for the Court nobles (kugeshu-hatto), to which the Imperial assent was obtained. This was the first instance of a military man legislating for the nobles of the capital; but it must be noted that the latter by their own misconduct furnished an opportunity for such interference. A Court scandal assumed such dimensions, in 1607, that the Emperor ordered the Bakufu to investigate the matter and to inflict suitable punishment. Ieyasu summoned a number of the offenders to Sumpu, where he subjected fourteen of them to severe examination. Ultimately some were sentenced to exile and others were deprived of their ranks, while the principal malefactor, Inokuma, general of the Left, was condemned to death. This affair demonstrated that the effective power was in the hands of the military, and throughout the Tokugawa rule they never failed to exercise it. In September of the year that witnessed the fall of Osaka Castle, Ieyasu and Hidetada summoned all the provincial governors to Momo-yama, and handed to them a body of rules entitled the "Laws of the Military Houses." These laws ran as follows:-*
*The translation of these laws is taken from a paper read by Mr.
Consul-General J. C. Hall and recorded in the "Transactions of the
Asiatic Society of Japan" for 1911.
Consul-General J. C. Hall and recorded in the "Transactions of the
Asiatic Society of Japan" for 1911.
"(1) Literature, arms, archery, and horsemanship are, systematically, to be the favourite pursuits.
"Literature first, and arms next was the rule of the ancients. They must both be cultivated concurrently. Archery and horsemanship are the more essential for the military houses. Weapons of warfare are ill-omened words to utter; the use of them, however, is an unavoidable necessity. In times of peace and good order we must not forget that disturbance may arise. Dare we omit to practise our warlike exercise and drill?"
Although this provision ostensibly encouraged the pursuit of literary and military arts, those who read the law too implicitly and devoted themselves too earnestly to the pursuit of arms quickly found that they were not in touch with the time or with the intention of the legislators. In fact, the purpose of the latter was to bracket literature and the art of war together, giving no preference to either.
"(2) Drinking parties and gaming amusements must be kept within due bounds.
"In our Instructions it is laid down that strict moderation in these respects is to be observed. To be addicted to venery and to make a pursuit of gambling is the first step towards the loss of one's domain."
This rule may be said to define what is known in Europe as "conduct unbecoming an officer." Not to know how to order one's tongue was as grave an offence as debauchery, according to the canons of the samurai.
"(3) Offenders against the law are not to be harboured in feudal domains.
"Law is the very foundation of ceremonial decorum and of social order. To infringe the law in the name of reason is as bad as to outrage reason in the name of law. To disregard the law (laid down by us) is an offence which will not be treated with leniency."
This provision was directly suggested by the Government's desire to suppress Christianity.
"(4) Throughout the domains whether of the greater or lesser barons (daimyo and shomyo) or of the holders of minor benefits, if any of the gentry or soldiers (shi and sotsu) in their service be guilty of rebellion or murder, such offenders must be at once expelled from their domain.
"Fellows of savage disposition (being retainers) are an apt weapon for overthrowing the domain or the family employing them, and a deadly instrument for cutting off the common people. How can such be tolerated?"
In the early days of the Yedo Bakufu it was not uncommon for a feudatory to enrol among his vassals refugee samurai who had blood on their hands. These would often be pursued into the fiefs where they had taken refuge, and much disorder resulted. The above provision removed these murderers from the protection of the feudatory in whose service they had enlisted.
"(5) Henceforth no social intercourse is to be permitted outside of one's own domain with the people (gentry and commoners) of another domain.
"In general, the customs of the various domains are all different from one another, each having its own peculiarities. To divulge the secrets of one's own domain is a sure indication of an intent to curry favour."
It has been shown that by the Chinese masters of strategy whose works were studied in Japan the art of espionage was placed on a high pinnacle. This teaching appears to have produced such evil results that the Tokugawa legislated against it.
"(6) The residential castles in the domains may be repaired; but the matter must invariably be reported. Still more imperative is it that the planning of structural innovations of any kind must be absolutely avoided.
"A castle with a parapet exceeding three thousand feet by ten is a bane to a domain. Crenelated walls and deep moats (of castles) are causes of anarchy."
This provision was important as a means of enfeebling the barons. They were not at liberty to repair even a fence of the most insignificant character or to dredge a moat, much more to erect a parapet, without previous sanction from the Bakufu.
"(7) If, in a neighbouring domain, innovations are being hatched or cliques being formed, the fact is to be reported without delay.
"Men are always forming groups; whilst, on the other hand, few ever come to anything. On this account, they fail to follow their lords or fathers, and soon come into collision with those of neighbouring villages. If the ancient prohibitions are not maintained, somehow or other innovating schemes will be formed."
Everything in the form of combination, whether nominally for good or for evil, was regarded with suspicion by the Bakufu, and all unions were therefore interdicted. Of course, the most important incident which the law was intended to prevent took the form of alliances between barons of adjacent provinces.
"(8) Marriages must not be contracted at private convenience.
"Now, the marriage union is a result of the harmonious blending of the In and Yo (i.e. the Yin and Yang of Chinese metaphysics, the female and male principles of nature). It is therefore not a matter to be lightly undertaken. It is said in the 'Scowling' passage of the (Chow) Book of Changes, 'Not being enemies they unite in marriage.' Whilst (the elders are) thinking of making advances to the opponent (family), the proper time (for the marriage of the young couple) is allowed to slip by. In the 'Peach Young' poem of the Book of Odes it is said, 'If the man and woman, duly observing what is correct, marry at the proper time of life, there will be no widows in the land.' To form cliques (political parties) by means of matrimonial connexions is a source of pernicious stratagems."
This provision was, in fact, a codification of the veto pronounced by Hideyoshi on his death-bed against marriages between the families of different daimyo. Ieyasu himself had been the first to violate the veto, and he was the first to place it subsequently on the statute book. The third Tokugawa shogun, Iemitsu, extended the restriction by ordering that even families having estates of only three thousand koku should not intermarry without Yedo's previous consent.
"(9) As to the rule that the daimyo shall come (to the shogun's court at Yedo) to do service:—
"In the Shoku Nihongi (The Continuation of the Chronicles of Japan) it is recorded amongst the enactments,
"'Except when entrusted with some official duty to assemble, no one (dignitary) is allowed at his own pleasure to assemble his tribe within the limits of the capital, no one is to go about attended by more than twenty horsemen, etc.'
"Hence it is not permissible to lead about a large force of soldiers. For daimyo whose revenues range from 1,000,000 koko down to 200,000 koku, the number of twenty horsemen is not to be exceeded. For those whose revenues are 100,000 koku and under, the number is to be in the same proportion.
"On occasions of official service, however (i.e. in time of warfare), the number of followers is to be in proportion to the social standing of each daimyo."
The above rule of repairing to the capital to pay respects (go-sankin) was an old fashion, and barons were accustomed to go with large retinues. Thus, it often happened that collisions occurred between the corteges of hostile feudatories, and it was to prevent these sanguinary encounters that the Tokugawa set strict limits to the number of samurai accompanying a military chief.
"(10) There must be no confusion in respect of dress uniforms, as regards the materials thereof.
"The distinction between lord and vassal, between superior and inferior, must be clearly marked by the apparel. Retainers may not, except in rare cases by special favour of their lords, indiscriminately wear silk stuffs, such as shiro-aya (undyed silk with woven patterns), shiro-kosode (white wadded silk coats), murasaki-awase (purple silk coats, lined), murasaki-ura (silk coats lined with purple); nori (white gloss silk), mumon (silk coat without the wearer's badge dyed on it), kosode (a coloured silk-wadded coat). In recent times, retainers and henchmen (soldiers) have taken to wearing rich damasks and silk brocade. This elaborate display was not allowed by the ancient laws and it must be severely kept within bounds."
"(11) Miscellaneous persons are not at their pleasure to ride in palanquins.
"There are families who for special reasons from of old have (inherited) the privilege of riding in palanquins without permission from the authorities: and there are others who by permission of the authorities exercise that privilege. But, latterly, even sub-vassals and henchmen of no rank have taken to so riding. This is a flagrant impertinence. Henceforward the daimyo of the provinces, and such of their kinsfolk as are men of distinction subordinate to them, may ride without applying for Government permission. Besides those, the following have permission, viz., vassals and retainers of high position about their lords; doctors and astrologers; persons of over sixty years of age, and sick persons and invalids. If ordinary retainers, or inferior henchmen (sotsu) are allowed to ride in palanquins, it will be considered to be the fault of their lords.
"This proviso, however, does not apply to Court nobles, abbots, or ecclesiastics in general.
"(12) The samurai throughout the provinces are to practise frugality.
"Those who are rich like to make a display, whilst those who are poor are ashamed of not being on a par with the others. There is no other influence so pernicious to social observances as this; and it must be strictly kept in check."
Frugality always occupied a prominent place in the Bakufu's list of essentials. Frequent and strenuous efforts were made by successive shoguns to encourage people in this virtue, but with the long peace enjoyed by the country under Tokugawa rule, a tendency to increasing luxury constantly prevailed, and the Government's aims in this respect were not realized except for brief periods. During the administration of the first three Tokugawa shoguns, and under the eighth shogun (Yoshimune), some success attended official injunctions of economy, but on the whole a steady growth of extravagance characterized the era.
"(13) The lords of domain (kokushu, masters of provinces) must select men of capacity for office.
"The way to govern is to get hold of the proper men. The merits and demerits (of retainers) should be closely scanned, and reward or reproof unflinchingly distributed accordingly. If there be capable men in the administration, that domain is sure to flourish; if there be not capable men, then the domain is sure to go to ruin. This is an admonition which the wise ones of antiquity all agree in giving forth."
"The tenor of the foregoing rules must be obeyed.
"Keicho, 20th year, 7th month (September 23, 1615)."
The above body of laws may be regarded as the Tokugawa Constitution. They were re-enacted by each shogun in succession on assuming office. The custom was to summon all the daimyo to Yedo, and to require their attendance at the Tokugawa palace, where, in the presence of the incoming shogun, they listened with faces bowed on the mats to the reading of the laws. Modifications and additions were, of course, made on each occasion, but the provisions quoted above remained unaltered in their essentials. Up to the time of the third shogun (Iemitsu), the duty of reading aloud the laws at the solemn ceremonial of the new shogun's investiture devolved on a high Buddhist priest, but it was thereafter transferred to the representative of the Hayashi family (to be presently spoken of). Any infraction of the laws was punished mercilessly, and as their occasionally loose phraseology left room for arbitrary interpretation, the provisions were sometimes utilized in the interest of the shogun and at the expense of his enemies.
RULES FOR THE IMPERIAL COURT AND COURT NOBLES
In the same month of the same year there was promulgated a body of laws called the "Rules of the Imperial Court, and the Court Nobles" (Kinchu narabi ni Kugeshu Sho-hatto). This enactment bore the signatures of the kwampaku and the shogun and had the Imperial sanction. It consisted of seventeen articles, but only five of them had any special importance:
"(1) Learning is the most essential of all accomplishments. Not to study is to be ignorant of the doctrines of the ancient sages, and an ignorant ruler has never governed a nation peacefully."
This specious precept was not intended to be literally obeyed. The shoguns had no desire for an erudite Emperor. Their conception of learning on the part of the sovereign was limited to the composition of Japanese verselets. A close study of the doctrines of the ancient Chinese sages might have exposed the illegitimacy of the Bakufu administration. Therefore, Yedo would have been content that the Mikado should think only of spring flowers and autumn moonlight, and should not torment his mind by too close attention to the classics.
"(2) A man lacking in ability must not be appointed to the post of regent or minister of State even though he belong to the Go-sekke (Five Designated Families), and it is needless to say that none but a member of those families may serve in such a position."
"(3) A man of ability, even though he be old, shall not be allowed to resign the post of regent or minister of State in favour of another. If he attempts to resign, his resignation should be refused again and again."
The above two provisions practically conferred on the Bakufu the power of not only appointing the regent and ministers of State but also of keeping them in office. For, as the law had been framed in Yedo, in Yedo also was vested competence to judge the ability or disability of a candidate. Hence, when the Emperor proposed to appoint a regent or a minister, the Bakufu had merely to intimate want of confidence in the nominee's ability; and similarly, if the sovereign desired to dismiss one of those high officials, the shogun could interfere effectually by reference to the letter of the law. Thus, the power of appointing and dismissing the great officials in Kyoto, which is one of the important prerogatives of the crown, was practically usurped by the shogun.
"(4) An adopted son shall always be chosen from the family of his adopter; and a female shall never be adopted to be the head of a family, no such custom having existed in Japan at any time."
This provision had two main objects. The first was to avert adoptions having the effect of combinations; the second, to prevent adoption of Imperial princes into other families. The Bakufu sought, as far as possible, to bring about the taking of the tonsure by all princes of the Blood who were not in the direct line of the succession, and to keep these princes from attaining to the posts of regents or ministers of State.
"(5) All reports shall be submitted to the Emperor by the regent, the denso, or an administrator (bugyo). Any other person who, in disregard of this rule, attempts to address the Throne direct, shall be sent into exile, whatever his rank."
The denso mentioned in this provision was an official appointed by the Bakufu for that special purpose. The whole arrangement as to communication with the Throne constituted a powerful buttress of Bakufu influence. Generally, the latter could contrive, as has been shown above, to control the appointment and continuance in office of a regent or a minister, while as for the administrators (bugyo), they were nominees of Yedo. It thus resulted that the Throne was approachable through the channel of the Bakufu only.
LAWS WITH REFERENCE TO BUDDHISM
The above laws remained unchanged throughout the Tokugawa era. A special law was also enacted with reference to Buddhist sects and the principal Buddhist temples. Ieyasu secured to these temples the possession of their manors by granting title-deeds bearing what was called the "go-shuinji," or "vermilion signature." The term was not really applicable in the case of Ieyasu. It is true that Hideyoshi, doubtless in imitation of Chinese custom, stamped a vermilion seal upon documents of this character; but the Tokugawa shoguns employed a black signature written with a pen. Nevertheless, the term "go-shuinji" continued to be used from the time of the Taiko downwards. It was an outcome of Ieyasu's astuteness that the great Hongwan temple was divided into two branches, eastern and western, by which process its influence was prevented from becoming excessive. During the administration of the third shogun, every daimyo was required to adhere to a definite sect of Buddhism, and to the Buddhist and Shinto temples was entrusted the duty of keeping an accurate census of their parishioners. The direct purpose of these latter laws was to facilitate the extermination of Christianity. Anyone whose name was not enrolled on one of the above lists fell under suspicion of embracing the foreign faith.
A JAPANESE HISTORIAN'S OPINION
Referring to the above laws the Tokugawa Jidaishi says:
"The above laws and regulations were the Constitution of the Tokugawa Bakufu. By the aid of their provisions the influence of Yedo was extended to every part of the nation from the Imperial Court to the world of religion. No such codes had ever previously existed in Japan. Any unit of the nation, whether a Court noble, a great feudatory, a priest, or a common samurai, had to yield implicit obedience or to suffer condign punishment. Thus, it fell out that everybody being anxious to conform with the rules, the universal tendency was to share in preserving the peace. From the point of view of this system, Ieyasu was eminently above all modern and ancient heroes. Hideyoshi won brilliant victories in war, but he saw no better method of maintaining peace at home than to send the country's armies to fight abroad. He seems to have conceived a hope that his generals would find goals for their ambition in Korea or China, and would exhaust their strength in endeavouring to realize their dreams. But his plan brought about the contrary result; for the generals formed fresh enmities among themselves, and thus the harvest that was subsequently reaped at Sekigahara found hands to sow it.
"Ieyasu, however, prized literature above militarism. He himself became a pioneer of learning, and employed many scholars to assist in constructing a solid framework of peace. The territorial nobles had to follow his example. Even Kato Kiyomasa, Asano Yukinaga, and Kuroda Nagamasa, each of whom during his lifetime was counted a divinely inspired general, found themselves constrained to study the Chinese classics under the guidance of Funabashi Hidekata and Fujiwara Seigwa. How much more cogent, then, was the similar necessity under which lesser men laboured. Thus, Ieyasu's love of literature may be regarded as a cause of the peace that prevailed under the Tokugawa for 260 years."
REVIVAL OF LEARNING
Ieyasu employed four instruments for educational purposes—the establishment of schools, the engagement of professors, the collection of ancient literary works, and the printing of books. In accordance with his last will his son Yoshinao, daimyo of Owari, built, in 1636, the Daiseiden College beside the temple of Kiyomizu in Ueno Park, near the villa of Hayashi Kazan, the celebrated Confucian scholar; but, in 1691, the college was moved to the slope called Shohei-zaka, where a bridge—Shohei-bashi—was thrown across the river. "Shohei" is the Japanese pronunciation of "Changping," Confucius's birthplace, and the school was known as the Shohei-ko. It received uniform patronage at the hands of the Tokugawa, whose kinsmen and vassals were required to study there, their proficiency, as determined by its examinations, being counted a passport to office. Yoshinao laid the foundation of a great library at the school and the number of volumes was constantly increased.
During the lifetime of Ieyasu, one of the most noted scholars was Fujiwara Seigwa. By the invitation of the Tokugawa chief he lectured on the classics in Kyoto, and it is recorded that Ieyasu, who had just (1600) arrived in that city, attended one of these lectures, wearing his ordinary garments. Seigwa is related to have fixed his eyes on Ieyasu and addressed him as follows: "The greatest work of Confucius teaches that to order oneself is the most essential of achievements. How shall a man who does not order himself be able to order his country? I am lecturing on ethics to one who behaves in a disorderly and discourteous manner. I believe that I preach in vain." Ieyasu immediately changed his costume, and the event contributed materially to the reputation alike of the intrepid teacher and of the magnanimous student, as well as to the popularity of Seigwa's doctrines.
Hayashi Kazan was a disciple of Seigwa whose reputation as a scholar he rivalled. Ieyasu employed him extensively in drafting laws; and many of his disciples subsequently served as teachers of the Chinese classics. The scripture of Hayashi's school of ethics was Chu Hi's commentary on the "Great Learning" of Confucius. In this system, ethics become a branch of natural philosophy. "Corresponding to the regular change of the seasons in nature is right action in man (who is the crown of nature), in the relation of sovereign and subject, parent and child, elder brother and younger brother, husband and wife, friend and friend. To his sovereign, or lord, he is bound to be faithful; to his parents, dutiful, and to his elder brother, respectful. Affection should characterize the relations of husband and wife and trust those of friend with friend."
A moment's consideration of this ethical system shows that it cannot be reconciled with such a form of administration as that existing under the Bakufu. Genuine loyalty to the sovereign found no place in the practical code of Tokugawa. Whether Ieyasu appreciated that fact or whether he ignored it in consideration of the civilizing and tranquillizing influences of Confucianism, there is nothing to show. Ultimately, however, it was to the ethics of the Chinese sage that the Tokugawa downfall became indirectly attributable.
Ieyasu showed much earnestness in searching for and collecting ancient books. Before and after the war of Osaka, he ordered priests to copy old books and records preserved in Buddhist temples and noblemen's houses. Subsequently, during the Kwanei era—1621-1643—there was built within the castle of Yedo a library called Momijiyama Bunko where the books were stored. He was also instrumental in causing the compilation and publication of many volumes whose contents contribute materially to our historical knowledge. The writing of history in the Imperial Court had been abandoned for many years, and the scholars employed by Ieyasu had recourse to private diaries for materials. Hayashi Kazan (Doshuri) was entrusted with the duty of distinguishing between the true and the false in using these records, and there resulted two memorable works. The second of these consisted in the main of genealogical tables. It extended to 372 volumes and subsequently became the Kwanei Shoke Keizu-den. The first, a national history, was originally called the Honcho Hennen-roku. Before its compilation Kazan (Doshun) died, and the book was concluded by his son, Harukatsu, in the year 1635. It consisted of three hundred volumes in all, and covered the period from the age of the Gods to the year 1610. It is now known as the Honcho Tsugan. The two works having been published to the order and under the patronage of the Bakufu, their contents were by no means free from the stain of favour and affection, but they nevertheless possess inestimable historical value.
THE SECOND TOKUGAWA SHOGUN, HIDETADA
Hidetada, third son of Ieyasu, was born in 1579; succeeded to the shogunate in 1605; abdicated in 1622, and died in 1632. His appearance on the historical stage was not very glorious, for, as already shown, when marching to join his father's army before the battle of Sekigahara, he allowed himself to be detained so long at the siege of Ueda Castle that he failed to be present at the great combat, and Ieyasu, as a mark of displeasure, refused to meet him until Honda Masazumi pleaded Hidetada's cause. During the first eleven years of his shogunate he exercised little real authority, the administration being conducted by Ieyasu himself from his nominal place of retirement in Sumpu. Thus, the period of Hidetada's independent sway extended over six years only. But during the ten subsequent years he continued to exercise much camera influence over the Government, though his power was inferior to that which had been wielded by Ieyasu in nominal retirement. Honda Masazumi, who had befriended him at the critical time mentioned above, occupied the highest post in the administration, the second place being assigned to Sakai Tadayo, while in Kyoto the Tokugawa interests were guarded by Itakura Katsushige and Matsudaira Masatsuna.
The era of Hidetada was essentially one of organization, and by the exercise of sincerity and justice he contributed much to the stability of the Tokugawa rule. Not the least memorable step taken by him related to the fortress of Yedo. In the year following his succession, he ordered the feudatories of the east to construct the castle which remains to this day one of the marvels of the world. "Around it stretched a triple line of moats, the outermost measuring nine and a half miles in length, the innermost one and a half, their scarps constructed with blocks of granite nearly as colossal as those of the Osaka stronghold, though in the case of the Yedo fortification every stone had to be carried hundreds of miles over the sea. The gates were proportionately as huge as those at Osaka, well-nigh the most stupendous works ever undertaken, not excepting even the Pyramids of Egypt. There is not to be found elsewhere a more striking monument of military power, nor can anyone considering such a work, as well as its immediate predecessor, the Taiko's stronghold at Osaka, and its numerous contemporaries of lesser but still striking proportions in the principal fiefs, refuse to credit the Japanese with capacity for large conceptions and competence to carry them into practice."
CONJUGAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE IMPERIAL FAMILY AND THE TOKUGAWA
It had been one of the most cherished wishes of Ieyasu to follow the Fujiwara precedent by establishing conjugal relations between the Imperial family and the Tokugawa. But the ex-Emperor, Go-Yozei, turned a deaf ear to this proposal on the ground that a lady born in a military house had never been chosen consort of a sovereign. Ieyasu, however, did not abandon his purpose. He entrusted its prosecution to Todo Takatora, and in 1616, the year of Ieyasu's death, Todo induced Konoe Nobuhiro, minister of the Right, to promote this undertaking. Nobuhiro, being the Emperor's younger brother, was able to exert much influence, and finally the ex-Emperor gave his consent. In June, 1620, Kazuko, daughter of Hidetada, became first lady-in-waiting, and ultimately Empress under the name of Tofuku-mon-in. It is recorded that 1180 chests were required to carry her trousseau from Yedo, and that the costs of her outfit and of her journey to Kyoto aggregated more than a million sterling. She gave birth to two princes and five princesses, and the house of Konoe, which had been instrumental in procuring her summons to the Court, became the leader of the Go-sekke.
DEATH OF HIDETADA AND HIS CHARACTER
After resigning the shogunate in 1622, Hidetada retired to the inner castle (Nishi Maru) in Yedo and there continued to direct affairs. He died ten years later, at the age of fifty-eight, and was interred at the temple Zojo-ji, in the Shiba district of the eastern capital. Japanese historians agree that Hidetada's character was adapted for the work of consolidation that fell to his lot. He resembled his father, Ieyasu, in decision and perseverance; he never dealt lightly with any affair, and while outwardly gentle and considerate, he was at heart subtle and uncompromising. An interesting illustration of the administrative canons of the time is afforded in the advice said to have been given by Hosokawa Tadaoki when consulted by Hidetada. "There is an old proverb," Tadaoki replied, "that if a round lid be put on a square vessel, those within will have ease; but if a square lid be used to cover a square vessel, there will result a feeling of distress." Asked for a standard by which to judge qualifications for success, the same nobleman answered that an oyster shell found on the Akashi shore is the best type of a man qualified to succeed, for the shell has been deprived of all its angles by the beating of the waves. Of Hidetada himself there is told an anecdote which shows him to have been remarkably free from superstition. A comet made its appearance and was regarded with anxiety by the astrologists of Kyoto, who associated its advent with certain misfortune. Hidetada ridiculed these fears. "What can we tell," he said, "about the situation of a solitary star in the wide universe, and how can we know that it has anything to do with this little world?"
THE THIRD SHOGUN, IEMITSU
Iemitsu, son of Hidetada, was born in 1603; succeeded to the shogunate in 1622, and held that post until his death, in 1651. His principal ministers were Ii Naotaka (who had occupied the post of premier since the days of Ieyasu), Matsudaira Nobutsuna, and Abe Tadaaki, one of the ablest officers that served the Tokugawa. He devoted himself to consolidating the system founded by his grandfather, Ieyasu, and he achieved remarkable success by the exercise of exceptional sagacity and determination. In 1626, he proceeded to Kyoto at the head of a large army, simply for the purpose of conveying to the feudal nobles a significant intimation that he intended to enforce his authority without hesitation. Up to that, time the feudal chiefs were not officially required to reside in Yedo for any fixed time or at any fixed interval. But now it was clearly enacted that the feudatories of the east and those of the west should repair to the Bakufu capital, at different seasons in the year; should remain there a twelvemonth,—in the case of feudal lords from the Kwanto only six months—and should leave their wives and families as hostages during the alternate period of their own absence from the shogun's city, which they spent in the provinces.
This system was technically called sankin kotai, that is "alternate residence in capital." From the point of view of the Tokugawa the plan was eminently wise, for it bound the feudal chiefs closer to the shogun, keeping them under his eye half the time and giving hostages for their good behaviour the other half; and it helped the growth of Yedo both in financial and political power, by bringing money into it and by making it more than before an administrative headquarters. On the other hand there was a corresponding drain on the provinces, all the greater since the standard of living at Yedo was higher than in rural districts and country nobles thus learned extravagance. To prevent other families from growing too rich and powerful seems to have been a part of Ieyasu's definite plan for holding in check possible rivals of the Tokugawa, so that it is not impossible that he foresaw this very result. At any rate it is known that in the instructions for government which he handed down to his successors he urged them to keep strict surveillance over their feudal lords and if any one of them seemed to be growing rich to impose upon him such a burden of public works as would cripple him.
In 1632, Iemitsu made another military demonstration at Kyoto, and on this occasion the Emperor would have conferred on him the post of prime minister (dajo daijiri). But he refused to accept it. This refusal was subsequently explained as a hint to the feudal chiefs that inordinate ambition should be banished from their bosoms; but in reality Iemitsu was influenced by the traditional principle that the Throne had no higher gift to bestow on a subject than the shogunate.
PROMINENT FEATURES OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF IEMITSU
The prominent feature of this able ruler's administration was that he thoroughly consolidated the systems introduced by his grandfather and confirmed by his father. From the time of Iemitsu downwards, cardinal forms were never changed, alterations being confined to non-essentials. On his death-bed he desired that his prime minister, Hotta Masamori, and several other notables should accompany him to the tomb, and on the night of the 10th of June, 1651, Hotta Masamori (aged forty-six), Abe Shigetsugu (aged fifty-two), Uchida Masanobu (aged thirty-three), Masamori's mother (aged sixty-three), Saegusa Moriyoshi, and Okuyama Yasushige all committed suicide. Their tombs stand to this day in Nikko.
THE NIKKO SHRINE AND THE KWANEI TEMPLE
It has been related how largely Ieysau was aided against the Osaka party by Tengai, abbot of Enryaku-ji. This priest it was that devised the singular accusation connected with the inscription on a bell at Hoko-ji. He received from Ieyasu the diocese of Nikko in Shimotsuke province, where he built a temple which ultimately served as the shrine of Ieyasu. But the first Tokugawa shogun, faithful to his frugal habits, willed that the shrine should be simple and inexpensive, and when Hidetada died, his mausoleum (mitamaya) at the temple Zojo-ji in Yedo presented by its magnificence such a contrast to the unpretending tomb at Nikko, that Iemitsu ordered Akimoto Yasutomo to rebuild the latter, and issued instructions to various feudal chiefs to furnish labour and materials. The assistance of even Korea, Ryukyu, and Holland was requisitioned, and the Bakufu treasury presented 700,000 ryo of gold. The shrine was finished in 1636 on a scale of grandeur and artistic beauty almost unsurpassed in any other country. The same priest, Tengai, was instrumental in building the temple known as Kwanei-ji, and at his suggestion, Hidetada asked the Imperial Court to appoint a prince to the post of abbot (monsu).
This system already existed in the case of Enryaku-ji on Hiei-zan in Kyoto, and it was Tengai's ambition that his sect, the Tendai, should possess in Yedo a temple qualified to compete with the great monastery of the Imperial capital. Thus, Ueno hill on which the Yedo structure stood was designated "Toei-zan," as the site of the Kyoto monastery was designated "Hiei-zan," and just as the temple on the latter received the name of "Enryaku-ji," after the era of its construction (Enryaku), so that in Yedo was named "Kwanei-ji," the name of the year period of its foundation being Kwanei. Finally, the Kwanei-ji was intended to guard the "Demon's Gate" of the Bakufu city as the Enryaku-ji guarded the Imperial capital. Doubtless, in furthering this plan, Iemitsu had for ultimate motive the association of an Imperial prince with the Tokugawa family, so that in no circumstances could the latter be stigmatized as "rebels." Not until the day of the Tokugawa's downfall did this intention receive practical application, when the priest-prince of Ueno (Prince Kitashirakawa) was set up as their leader by the remnants of the Bakufu army.
ISE AND NIKKO
Through many centuries it had been the custom of the Imperial Court to worship at the great shrine of Ise and to offer suitable gifts. This ceremony was long suspended, however, on account of continuous wars as well as the impecunious condition of the Court. Under the sway of the Oda and the Toyotomi, fitful efforts were made to renew the custom, but it was left for the Tokugawa to re-establish it. The third shogun, Iemitsu, petitioned the Court in that sense, and assigned an estate in Yamashiro as a means of defraying the necessary expenses, the Fujinami family being appointed to perform the ceremony hereditarily. At the same time Iemitsu petitioned that the Court should send an envoy to worship at Nikko every year on the anniversary of the death of Ieyasu, and this request having been granted, Nikko thenceforth became to the Tokugawa what Ise was to the Imperial Court.
BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY
It has been shown that the Shimabara revolt finally induced the Bakufu Government to adopt the policy of international seclusion and to extirpate Christianity. In carrying out the latter purpose, extensive recourse was had to the aid of Buddhism. The chief temple of each sect of that religion was officially fixed, as were also the branch temples forming the parish of the sect; every unit of the nation was required to register his name in the archives of a temple, and the Government ordered that the priests should keep accurate lists of births and deaths. Anyone whose name did not appear on these lists was assumed to belong to the alien faith. This organization was completed in the time of Iemitsu.
THE FOURTH SHOGUN, IETSUNA
Ietsuna, the fourth Tokugawa shogun, eldest son of Iemitsu, was born in 1642 and succeeded to the office in 1651, holding it until his death in 1680. In bequeathing the administrative power to a youth in his tenth year, Iemitsu clearly foresaw that trouble was likely to arise. He therefore instructed his younger brother, Hoshina Masayuki, baron of Aizu, to render every assistance to his nephew, and he appointed Ii Naotaka to be prime minister, associating with him Sakai Tadakatsu, Matsudaira Nobutsuna, Abe Tadaaki, and other statesmen of proved ability. These precautions were soon seen to be necessary, for the partisans of the Toyotomi seized the occasion to attempt a coup. The country at that time swarmed with ronin (wave-men); that is to say, samurai who were, for various reasons, roving free-lances. There seems to have been a large admixture of something very like European chivalry in the make up of these ronin, for some of them seem to have wandered about merely to right wrongs and defend the helpless. Others sought adventure for adventure's sake and for glory's, challenging the best swordsman in each place to which they came. Many seem to have taken up the lives of wanderers out of a notion of loyalty; the feudal lords to whom they had owed allegiance had been crushed by the Tokugawa and they refused to enter the service of the shogun.
The last-named reason seems to have been what prompted the revolt of 1651, when Ietsuna, aged ten, had just succeeded in the shogunate his father Iemitsu who had exalted the power of the Tokugawa at the expense of their military houses. The ronin headed by Yui Shosetsu and Marubashi Chuya plotted to set fire to the city of Yedo and take the shogun's castle. The plot was discovered. Shosetsu committed suicide, and Chuya was crucified. In the following year (1652) another intrigue was formed under the leadership of Bekki Shoetnon, also a ronin. On this occasion the plan was to murder Ii Naotaka, the first minister of State, as well as his colleagues, and then to set fire to the temple Zojo-ji on the occasion of a religious ceremony. But this plot, also, was discovered before it matured, and it proved to be the last attempt that was made to overthrow the Bakufu by force until more than two hundred years had passed.
THE LEGISLATION OF IEMITSU AND IETSUNA
On the 5th of August, 1635, a body of laws was issued by Iemitsu under the title of Buke Sho-hatto, and these laws were again promulgated on June 28, 1665, by the fourth shogun, Ietsuna, with a few alterations. The gist of the code of Iemitsu was as follows: That literature and arms were to be the chief object of cultivation; that the great and small barons were to do service by turns in Yedo, strict limits being set to the number of their retainers; that all work on new castles was strictly interdicted, and that all repairs of existing castles must not be undertaken without sanction from the Yedo administration; that in the event of any unwonted occurrence, all barons present at the scene must remain and await the shogun's orders; that no person other than the officials in charge might be present at an execution; that there must be no scheming innovations, forming of parties, or taking of oaths; that private quarrels were strictly interdicted, and that all matters difficult of arrangement must be reported to the Yedo administration; that barons having an income of ten thousand koku or more, and their chief officials, must not form matrimonial alliances without the shogun's permission; that greater simplicity and economy must be obeyed in social observances, such as visits of ceremony, giving and receiving presents, celebrating marriages, entertaining at banquets, building residences, and general striving after elegance; that there must be no indiscriminate intermingling (of ranks); that, as regards the materials of dress, undyed silk with woven patterns (shiro aya) must be worn only by Court nobles (kuge) and others of the highest ranks; that wadded coats of undyed silk might be worn by daimyo and others of higher rank; that lined coats of purple silk, silk coats with the lining of purple, white gloss silk, and coloured silk coats without the badge were not to be worn at random; that coming down to retainers, henchmen, and men-at-arms, the wearing by such persons of ornamental dresses such as silks, damask, brocade, or embroideries was quite unknown to the ancient laws, and a stop must be put to it; that all the old restrictions as to riding in palanquins must be observed; that retainers who had a disagreement with their original lord were not to be taken into employment by other daimyo; that if any such was reported as having been guilty of rebellion or homicide, he was to be sent back (to his former lord); that any who manifests a refractory disposition must either be sent back or expelled; that where the hostages given by sub-vassals to their mesne lords had committed an offence requiring punishment by banishment or death, a report in writing of the circumstances must be made to the administrators' office and their decision awaited; that in case the circumstances were such as to necessitate or justify the instant cutting-down of the offender, a personal account of the matter must be given to the administrator; that lesser feudatories must honestly discharge the duties of their position and refrain from giving unlawful or arbitrary orders (to the people of their fiefs); that they must take care not to impair the resources or well-being of the province or district in which they are; that roads, relays of post-horses, boats, ferries, and bridges must be carefully attended to, so as to ensure that there should be no delays or impediments to quick communication; that no private toll-bars might be erected or any existing ferry discontinued; that no vessels of over five hundred koku burden were to be built; that the glebe lands of shrines and temples scattered throughout the provinces, having been attached to them from ancient times to the present day, were not to be taken from them; that the Christian sect was to be strictly prohibited in all the provinces and in all places; that in case of any unfilial conduct the offender should be dealt with under the penal law; that in all matters the example set by the laws of Yedo was to be followed in all the provinces and places.
As has been noted above, this same body of laws was re-enacted under the authority of Ietsuna, with the following slight alterations, namely, that the veto was removed from the wearing of costly ornamented dresses by retainers, henchmen, and men-at-arms, and that the restriction as to size should not apply to a cargo vessel. At the same time a prohibition of junshi (following in death) was issued in these terms:
"That the custom of following a master in death is wrong and unprofitable is a caution which has been at times given from of old; but owing to the fact that it has not actually been prohibited, the number of those who cut their belly to follow their lord on his decease has become very great. For the future, to those retainers who may be animated by such an idea, their respective lords should intimate, constantly and in very strong terms, their disapproval of the custom. If, notwithstanding this warning, any instance of the practice should occur, it will be deemed that the deceased lord was to blame for unreadiness. Henceforward, moreover, his son and successor will be held blameworthy for incompetence, as not having prevented the suicides."*
*From a paper read by Mr. Consul-General J. C. Hall and recorded in the "Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan" for 1911.
RELEASE OF HOSTAGES
Another memorable step was taken during the administrative period of Ietsuna. It had been the custom to require that all the great nobles should send a number of their chief retainers or the latter's fathers, brothers, and sons to Yedo, where they were held as hostages for the peaceful conduct of their feudal chiefs. But when the system of sankin kotai had been in operation for some time, and when the power of the Tokugawa Bakufu had been fully consolidated, this practice of exacting hostages became superfluous and vexatious. It was therefore abandoned in the year 1665 and the hostages were all suffered to leave Yedo.
THE MING DYNASTY
The fall of the Ming dynasty in China took place in the thirteenth year of Ietsuna's succession, and for a moment it seemed that Japan might possibly take the field against the conquering Tatars. A Chinese immigrant who had settled in the island of Hirado, in Hizen, married the daughter of a Japanese farmer, and had a son by her. The immigrant's name was Cheng Chi-lung, and when the partisans of the Ming dynasty made their last stand at Foochaw, they chose Cheng for general, through him soliciting aid from the Yedo Bakufu. Their request was earnestly discussed in Yedo, and it is possible that had the Ming officers held out a little longer, Japan might have sent an expedition across the sea. Cheng Chi-lung's son, Cheng Cheng-kung, resisted to the last, and when he fell fighting at Macao, his Japanese mother committed suicide. Other fugitives from China, notably an able scholar named Chu Chi-yu, settled in Japan at this time, and contributed not a little to the promotion of art and literature.
YEDO
The influence of the sankin kotai system upon the prosperity of Yedo, as well as upon the efficiency of the Tokugawa administration, has already been noticed. Indeed, Yedo in the middle of the seventeenth century was one of the most populous and prosperous cities in the world. But very little intelligence had been exercised in planning it. The streets were narrow and there were no bridges across the main river. Thus, in 1657, a fire broke out which, being fanned by a violent wind, burned for two days, destroying the greater part of the city together with the residences of nearly all the daimyo. The calamity occurred in the month of February and was accompanied by a violent snowstorm, which greatly increased the sufferings of the citizens. Tradition says that 108,000 persons lost their lives, but that number is probably an exaggeration. In the following year, another similar catastrophe occurred on almost the same scale, and it seemed as though Yedo could never rise from its ashes. Yet the result of these calamities was salutary. The Bakufu selected suitable situations for the residences of the daimyo, and issued a law requiring that the main thoroughfares must have a width of sixty feet and even the by-streets must not be narrower than from thirty to thirty-six feet. Moreover, three bridges, namely, the Ryogoku, the Eitai, and the Shin-o, were thrown across the Sumida. This river, which formed the eastern boundary of the city, had hitherto been left unbridged for military reasons, and the result was that on the occasion of the great conflagration thousands of people, caught between the flames and the river bank, had to choose death by burning or by drowning. Nevertheless, some officials opposed the building of bridges, and were only silenced by the astute remark of Sakai Tadakatsu that if Yedo was ever to be a great city, the convenience of its inhabitants must be first consulted, for, after all, the people themselves constituted the best stronghold. This may be regarded as an evidence of the deference that was beginning then to be paid to the non-military classes by the samurai.
It was at this time (1658), also, that the city of Yedo obtained its first supply of good water. There was already an aquaduct from Inokashira Lake to the Kanda district of the city, but it carried only a very small volume of water, and the idea of harnessing the Tama-gawa to supply the town was due to two citizens, Shoemon and Seiemon, who subsequently received the family name of Tamagawa. The Bakufu granted a sum of 7500 ryo towards the expense, and on the completion of the work within two years, gifts of 300 ryo were made to the two projectors. The water had to be carried through a distance of over thirty miles, and the enterprise did high credit to the engineering skill of the men of the time.
DECADENCE OF THE BAKUFU ADMINISTRATION
The era of this fourth Tokugawa shogun, Ietsuna, was remarkable for things other than the lawlessness of the "wave-men." From that time the Tokugawa began to fare as nearly all great families of previous ages had fared: the substance of the administrative power passed into the hands of a minister, its shadow alone remaining to the shogun. Sakai Tadakiyo was the chief author of this change. Secluded from contact with the outer world, Ietsuna saw and heard mainly through the eyes and ears of the ladies of his household. But Tadakiyo caused an order to be issued forbidding all access to the Court ladies except by ministerial permit, and thenceforth the shogun became practically deaf and dumb so far as events outside the castle were concerned. Some Japanese historians describe this event as an access of "weariness" on the shogun's part towards the duties of administration. This is a euphemism which can be interpreted by what has been set down above. From 1666, when he became prime minister in Yedo, Sakai Tadakiyo seems to have deliberately planned the relegation of his master to the position of a fainéant and the succession of the shogun's son to supreme power. Tadakiyo's lust of authority was equalled only by his cupidity. Everything went to the highest bidder. It had gradually become the fashion that the daimyo should invite to their Yedo residences all the leading administrators of the Bakufu. On these entertainments great sums were squandered and valuable presents were a feature of the fetes. It also became fashionable to pay constant visits at the mansions of the chief officials and these visits were always accompanied with costly gifts. It is recorded that the mansion of Tadakiyo was invariably so crowded by persons waiting to pay their respects that a man repairing thither at daybreak could scarcely count on obtaining access by evening-fall. The depraved state of affairs brought the administration of the Tokugawa into wide disrepute, and loyal vassals of the family sadly contrasted the evil time with the days of Ieyasu, seventy years previously.
THE COURTS OF KYOTO AND OF YEDO
The great financial straits to which the Imperial Court was reduced during the time of the Muromachi shoguns have been already described. Both Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi made some endeavours to correct this evil state of affairs, and when Tokugawa Ieyasu came into power he adopted still more liberal methods. In 1604, he increased the revenue of the Court by 10,000 koku annually, and in the course of the next few years he caused the palace to be rebuilt on a scale of considerable grandeur. The same policy was pursued by the second shogun, Hidetada, who assigned to the ex-Emperor an income of 3000 koku and made various allowances to princes and other members of the Imperial family. The recipients of these allowances totalled 140, and it is on record that, in the year 1706, the revenues of the Imperial Court aggregated 29,000 koku; those of the ex-Emperor 15,000; those of the princes and Court nobles, 44,000; those of the Monzeki* temples, 19,000; those of the Court ladies and Imperial nuns, 7500, and those of the Court officials 2300, the whole making a total of about 120,000 koku. The income of the retired shogun alone equalled that amount, and it was enormously surpassed by the revenues of many of the daimyo. It must be noted, however, that although the rice provided for the above purposes was made a charge upon the Kinai provinces as well as upon Tamba and Omi, neither to the Emperor nor to the Imperial princes nor to the Court nobles were estates granted directly. These incomes were collected and transmitted by officials of the Bakufu, but not a tsubo of land was under the control of either sovereign or prince.
*Temples governed by Imperial princes.
Military affairs, civil administration, financial management, including the casting of coins, judicial and legislative affairs, the superintendence of temples, and so forth, were all in the hands of the Bakufu in Yedo or of provincial officials nominated by the shogun. Nothing could have been more complete than the exclusion of the Kyoto Court from the whole realm of practical government; nor could any system have contrasted more flagrantly with the theory of the Daika reforms, according to which every acre of land throughout the length and breadth of the empire was the property of the sovereign. It might have been expected that the Tokugawa shoguns would at least have endeavoured to soften this administrative effacement by pecuniary generosity; but so little of that quality did they display that the Emperor and the ex-Emperor were perpetually in a state of financial embarrassment. As for the Court nobles, their incomes did not always suffice even for the needs of every-day life, and they were obliged to have recourse to various devices, such as marrying their daughters to provincial governors or selling professional diplomas, the right of conferring which was vested in their families.
THE SEKKE, DENSO, AND SHOSHIDAI
The sole functions left to the Imperial Court were those of appointing the shogun—which of course was only formal—conferring ranks, fixing the name of year-periods, ordering the calendar, taking part in ceremonials, nominating priests and officials, and sanctioning the building of temples. Thus, the regent (kwampaku) was the sovereign's appointee. He had to be chosen in succession from one of the five families—Konoe, Takatsukasa, Kujo, Nijo, and Ichijo, to which the general name Go-sekke (the Five Regent Families) was given. But the regent was practically without power of any kind. Very different was the case of the denso, who had direct access to the Throne. Appointed by the shogun from one of seventeen families closely related to the Tokugawa, a denso, before entering upon the duties of his office, was obliged to swear that he would minutely and unreservedly report to the Bakufu everything coming to his knowledge. His principal duty was to communicate direct with the Throne. There was also another Bakufu nominee called the giso, who administered the affairs of the Imperial Court, and who held, in addition, the post of dai-nagon, chu-nagon, or sho-nagon, which offices were reserved for members of the Tokugawa family. Yet another official representing the Bakufu was the shoshidai, who managed all matters connected with the guarding of the Imperial Court and the Court nobles, at the same time transacting financial business. In the event of any disturbance occurring in Court circles in Kyoto, it was reported, first, to the shoshidai and, then, by him, to the senior officials in Yedo, while any disturbance occurring in Yedo was equally reported, first to the shoshidai and afterwards by the latter to the sovereign. The shoshidai was in fact a governor-general, with powers far superior to those of any Court noble, and his sway extended to the eight provinces in the neighbourhood of Kyoto. By means of the shoshidai all circumstances of the Imperial Court were fully conveyed to the Bakufu in Yedo and complete control was exercised over the Imperial capital and its environs. The Bakufu were careful to choose for this post a man whose loyalty and ability stood beyond question. Finally, reference may be made to the administrator of the reigning sovereign's Court (Kinri-zuki bugyo) and the administrator of the ex-Emperor's court (Sendo-zuki bugyo), both of whom were Bakufu nominees.
THE 107TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR GO-YOZEI (A.D. 1586-1611)
This Emperor held the sceptre throughout the memorable epoch from the death of Nobunaga till that of Ieyasu, and he continued to exercise power during six years after his abdication. It was he that conferred the post of shogun on Ieyasu and gave him his posthumous title of Tosho Gongen. His Majesty was the eldest son of the Emperor Okimachi. He surrendered the throne to his third son in 1611, dying at the age of forty-seven in 1617.
THE 108TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR GO-MIZU-NO-O (A.D. 1611-1629)
This sovereign had for consort a daughter of the shogun Hidetada, as already described. The wedding took place in the year 1620, and its magnificence offered a theme for enthusiastic comment by contemporary historians. The shogun was careful to surround the Imperial bride with officials of his own choosing, and these, joining hands with the shoshidai and the denso, constituted an entourage which ordered everything at Kyoto in strict accordance with the interests of the Tokugawa. The new Empress was dowered with an estate much larger than that of the Emperor himself, although the latter's allowance was increased by ten thousand koku. It is related that his Majesty's impecuniosity compelled the curtailment of various ceremonies and prevented the giving of presents in the ordinary routine of social conventions, so that it became necessary to replenish the Imperial purse by lending rice and money to the citizens at high rates of interest.
A serious collision occurred during Go-Mizu-no-o's reign between the Courts of Kyoto and Yedo. The Emperor, who inclined to literature and religion, conceived a profound reverence for two Buddhist prelates of great learning and conspicuously holy lives. To these priests, Takuan and Gyokushitsu, his Majesty presented purple robes, a mark of the highest distinction, in apparently unwitting violation of the ecclesiastical laws promulgated by Ieyasu, which forbade the giving of such robes to any bonzes except those of Kennin-ji. On learning of the incident, the Bakufu summoned these prelates to Yedo, deprived them of the robes, and sent them into banishment. The Emperor, naturally much offended, declared that he would no longer occupy the throne, and in 1629, the year of the two priests' transportation, he carried out his threat, abdicating in favour of the Imperial princess, Oki, his eldest daughter by the Tokugawa Empress.
THE 109TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPRESS MYOSHO (A.D. 1629-1643)
The Princess Oki, eldest daughter of Tokufu-mon-in and the Emperor Go-Mizu-no-o, was only seven years of age when thus called on to occupy the throne. During eight hundred years no female had wielded the sceptre of Japan, and the princess was not without a brother older than herself, though born of a different mother. Thus, the announcement of the Emperor's intention created profound astonishment in the Imperial Court. The partisans of the Bakufu supported the project, but the friends of the Imperial family denounced it strenuously. Nothing moved the Emperor, however. His Majesty appears to have thought that to bestow the princess' hand on a subject and to elevate her elder brother to the throne would surely be productive of serious mischief, since the husband of the princess, supported by the Bakufu, would prove an invincible power in the State.
As for the Tokugawa statesmen, some accounts allege that they objected to the Emperor's project, but others say that when the matter was reported in Yedo, the shogun signified that his Majesty might consult his own judgment. What is certain is that the Bakufu sent to Kyoto the prime minister, Sakai Tadakiyo, with three other representatives, and that shortly after their arrival in the Imperial capital, arrangements were completed for the proposed change. The Imperial consort, Tofuku-mon-in, was declared ex-Empress with a revenue of 10,000 koku, and the little princess, who is known in history as Myosho, received an income of 20,000 koku; while to the ex-Emperor, Go-Mizu-no-o, only 3000 koku were allotted. Not until 1634, on the occasion of a visit made by Iemitsu, was this glaring contrast corrected: the shogun then increased the ex-Emperor's allowance to 7000 koku, and his Majesty continued to administer public affairs from his place of retirement until 1680, when he died hi his eighty-fifth year.
THE 110TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR GO-KOMYO (A.D. 1643-1654)
This sovereign was a brother of the Empress Myosho but of a different mother. He was brought up by Tofuku-mon-in as though he were her real child, until he succeeded to the throne at the age of eleven, occupying it for eleven years. Form his earliest youth he showed sagacity, magnanimity, and benevolence. His love of literature was absorbing, and he studied earnestly, taking the priests of the Five Temples as his teachers. He is said to have arrived at the conclusion that a sovereign should never study any useless branch of learning, and as he failed to see the utility of Buddhism, he turned to Confucianism in preference. Moreover, dissatisfied with the old commentaries of the Han and Tang dynasties, he chose in their stead the new classics composed by Chengtsz and Chutsz; and as for Japanese literature, he condemned as grossly misleading works like the Genji Monogatari and the Ise Monogatari.
There can be no doubt that this sovereign conceived the ambition of recovering the administrative authority. His reign extended from the twenty-second year of Iemitsu's sway to the fifth of Ietsuna's, and in the troubles of that period he thought that he saw his opportunity. It is related that he devoted much attention to sword exercise, and the shoshidai Itakura Shigemune warned him that the study of military matters did not become the Imperial Court and would probably provoke a remonstrance from Yedo should the fact become known there. The Emperor taking no notice of this suggestion, Shigemune went so far as to declare his intention of committing suicide unless the fencing lessons were discontinued. Thereupon the young Emperor calmly observed: "I have never seen a military man kill himself, and the spectacle will be interesting. You had better have a platform erected in the palace grounds so that your exploit may be clearly witnessed." When this incident was reported by the shoshidai to Yedo, the Bakufu concluded that some decisive measure must be taken, but before their resolve had materialized and before the sovereign's plans had matured, he died of small-pox, in 1654, at the age of twenty-two, having accomplished nothing except the restoration and improvement of certain Court ceremonials, the enactment of a few sumptuary laws, and the abandonment of cremation in the case of Imperial personages.
THE 111TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR GO-SAIEN (A.D. 1654-1663) AND THE 112TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR REIGEN (A.D. 1663-1686)
Go-Saien was the sixth son of the Emperor Go-Mizu-no-o. His reign is remarkable in connexion with the attitude of the Yedo Bakufu towards the Throne. In 1657, as already related, Yedo was visited by a terrible conflagration, and another of scarcely less destructive violence occurred in the same city the following year, while, in 1661, the Imperial palace itself was burned to the ground, the same fate overtaking the principal Shinto shrine in Ise, and nearly every province suffering more or less from a similar cause. Moreover, in 1662, a series of earthquakes disturbed the country throughout a whole month, and the nation became almost demoralized in the face of these numerous calamities. Then the Bakufu took an extraordinary step. They declared that such visitations must be referred to the sovereign's want of virtue and that the only remedy lay in his abdication. The shogun, Ietsuna, was now ruling in Yedo. He sent envoys to Kyoto conveying an order for the dethronement of the Emperor, and although his Majesty was ostensibly allowed to abdicate of his own will, there could be no doubt as to the real circumstances of the case. His brother, Reigen, succeeded him, and after holding the sceptre for twenty-four years, continued to administer affairs from his place of retirement until his death, in 1732.
SANKE AND SANKYO
When Ieyasu, after the battle of Sekigahara, distributed the fiefs throughout the Empire, he gave four important estates to his own sons, namely, Echizen to Hideyasu; Owari to Tadayoshi; Mito to Nobuyoshi, and Echigo to Tadateru. Subsequently, after the deaths of Tadayoshi and Nobuyoshi, he assigned Owari to his sixth son, Yoshinao, and appointed his seventh son, Yorinobu, to the Kii fief, while to his eighth son, Yorifusa, Mito was given. These last three were called the Sanke (the Three Families). From them the successor to the shogunate was chosen in the event of failure of issue in the direct line. Afterwards this system was extended by the addition of three branch-families (Sankyo), namely those of Tayasu and Hitotsubashi by Munetake and Munetada, respectively, sons of the shogun Yoshimune, and that of Shimizu by Shigeyoshi, son of the shogun Ieshige. It was enacted that if no suitable heir to the shogunate was furnished by the Sanke, the privilege of supplying one should devolve on the Sankyo, always, however, in default of an heir in the direct line. The representatives of the Sanke had their estates and castles, but no fiefs were assigned to the Sankyo; they resided in Yedo close to the shogun's palace, and received each an annual allowance from the Bakufu treasury.
THE FEUDAL SYSTEM OF THE TOKUGAWA
It has been shown that in distributing the fiefs Ieyasu aimed at paralyzing the power of the tozama daimyo and vitalizing that of the fudai barons. This he effected, as far as concerned the tozama feudatories, by isolating them from each other, or by placing those of equal strength in juxtaposition, so that they might become rivals; while in the case of fudai barons, he established an effective system of communications between them, so that co-operation and concentration of forces were facilitated. Broadly speaking, this method had for result the planting of the tozama daimyo in the west and of the fudai barons in the east, as well as along the main roads between the two capitals. The plan worked admirably during 270 years, but at the Restoration, in 1867, the western daimyo combined to overthrow the shogunate.
Very noticeable were the steps taken to provide facilities for communication between Yedo and Kyoto. No less than fifty-three posting stations were established along the road from the Bakufu capital to the Imperial city, and at several places barriers were set up. Among these latter, Hakone was considered specially important. The duty of guarding the barrier there was assigned to the Okubo family, who enjoyed the full confidence of the Tokugawa and who had their castle in Odawara. No one could pass this barrier without a permit. Women were examined with signal strictness, they being regarded as part of the system which required that the wives of the daimyo should live in Yedo as hostages. Thus, whereas a man was granted ingress or egress if he carried a passport signed by his own feudal chief and addressed to the guards at the barrier, a woman might not pass unless she was provided with an order signed by a Bakufu official. Moreover, female searchers were constantly on duty whose business it was to subject women travellers to a scrutiny of the strictest character, involving, even, the loosening of the coiffure. All these precautions formed part of the sankin kotai system, which proved one of the strongest buttresses of Tokugawa power. But, from the days of Ietsuna, the wives and children of the daimyo were allowed to return to their provinces, and under the eighth shogun, Yoshimune, the system of sankin kotai ceased to be binding. This was because the Tokugawa found themselves sufficiently powerful to dispense with such artificial aids.
THE FIEFS
There were certain general divisions of the feudatories. Everyone possessing a fief of 10,000 koku or upwards was called a daimyo. The title included the Sanke, the Sankyo, the gokemon (governor of Echizen), the fudai (hereditary vassals), and the tozama. These were again subdivided into three classes according to the sizes of their fiefs. In the first class stood the kokushu (called also kuni-mochi, or provincial barons) who possessed revenues of at least 300,000 koku. The second class consisted of the joshu (called also shiro-mochi, or castle-owning barons) whose incomes ranged between 100,000 and 300,000 koku. Finally, the third class was composed of the ryoshu (sometimes known as shiro-nashi, or castleless barons), whose revenues ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 koku. These feudatories might be recommended by the shogun for Court rank in Kyoto, but the highest office thus conferred was that of dainagon (great councillor), from which fact the attitude of the feudatories towards imperially conferred distinctions can be easily appreciated. Nevertheless, the rules of etiquette were strictly observed by provincial magnates attending Court functions. They had to conform carefully to the order of their precedence and with the sumptuary rules as to colour and quality of garments, and any departure from these conventions was severely punished.
SUCCESSION
If a feudatory committed some crime or died childless, the law required that he should be transferred to another province, or that his successor should suffer a considerable reduction of revenue. Experience showed, however, that as many of the feudatories died childless, there were numerous losses of fiefs, and ultimately it was enacted that a baron might adopt a successor by way of precaution, unless he deferred that step until he lay dying or sought permission to take it before he reached the age of seventeen. This meant that if any feudal chief died before reaching his seventeenth year, his estate was lost to his family. By way of correcting such a hardship, the adoption of an heir was afterwards sanctioned without reference to the age of the adopter, and it was further decided that a man of fifty or upwards might adopt a son even on his death-bed. Finally, in the year 1704, all these restrictions were virtually abolished, and especially the rule that an adopted son must necessarily belong to the family of his adopter.
SEVERITY OF THE TOKUGAWA TOWARDS THE FEUDATORIES
Although Ieyasu and his successors in the shogunate did not fail to provide large estates for their own kith and kin, they never showed any leniency in dealing with the latter's offences. Ieyasu professed to believe in the potency of justice above all administrative instruments, and certainly he himself as well as his successors obeyed that doctrine unswervingly in so far as the treatment of their own families was concerned. They did not hesitate to confiscate fiefs, to pronounce sentence of exile, or even to condemn to death. Thus, in the year of Ieyasu's decease, his sixth son, Matsudaira Tadateru, was deprived of his fief—610,000 koku—and removed from Echigo to Asama, in Ise. Tadateru's offence was that he had unjustly done a vassal of the shogun to death, and had not moved to the assistance of the Tokugawa in the Osaka War. Moreover, when his elder brother, the shogun Hidetada, repaired to the Imperial palace, Tadateru had pretended to be too ill to accompany him, though in reality he was engaged in a hunting expedition. This was the first instance of the Bakufu punishing one of their own relatives.
Another example was furnished in 1623 when Matsudaira Tadanao, lord of Echizen, was sentenced to confinement in his own house and was ordered to hand over his fief of 750,000 koku to his heir. This Tadanao was a grandson of Ieyasu, and had shown himself a strong soldier in the Osaka War. But subsequently he fell into habits of violence and lawlessness, culminating in neglect of the sankin kotai system. His uncle, the shogun Hidetada, sentenced him as above described. Under the administration of Iemitsu this unflinching attitude towards wrongdoers was maintained more relentlessly than ever. The dai nagon, Tadanaga, lord of Suruga and younger brother of Iemitsu by the same mother, received (1618) in Kai province a fief of 180,000 koku, and, seven years later, this was increased by Suruga and Totomi, bringing the whole estate up to 500,000 koku. He resided in the castle of Sumpu and led an evil life, paying no attention whatever to the remonstrances of his vassals. In 1632, Iemitsu confiscated his fief and exiled him to Takasaki in Kotsuke, where he was compelled to undergo confinement in the Yashiki of Ando Shigenaga. Fourteen months later, sentence of death was pronounced against him at the early age of twenty-eight.
Other instances might be quoted showing how little mercy the Tokugawa shoguns extended to wrongdoers among their own relatives. It need hardly be said that outside clans fared no better. Anyone who gave trouble was promptly punished. Thus, in 1614, Okubo Tadachika, who had rendered good service to the Bakufu in early days, and who enjoyed the full confidence of the shogun, was deprived of his castle at Odawara and sentenced to confinement for the comparatively trifling offence of contracting a private marriage. Again, in 1622, the prime minister, Honda Masazumi, lord of Utsunomiya, lost his fief of 150,000 koku and was exiled to Dawe for the sin of rebuilding his castle without due permission, and killing a soldier of the Bakufu. To persons criticising this latter sentence as too severe, Doi Toshikatsu is recorded to have replied that any weakness shown at this early stage of the Tokugawa rule must ultimately prove fatal to the permanence of the Bakufu, and he expressed the conviction that none would approve the punishment more readily than Masazumi's dead father, Masanobu, were he still living to pass judgment.
Doubtless political expediency, not the dictates of justice, largely inspired the conduct of the Bakufu in these matters, for in proportion as the material influence of the Tokugawa increased, that of the Toyotomi diminished. In 1632, when the second shogun, Hidetada, died, it is related that the feudal barons observed the conduct of his successor, Iemitsu, with close attention, and that a feeling of some uneasiness prevailed. Iemitsu, whether obeying his own instinct or in deference to the advice of his ministers, Sakai Tadakatsu and Matsudaira Nobutsuna, summoned the feudal chiefs to his castle in Yedo and addressed them as follows: "My father and my grandfather, with your assistance and after much hardship, achieved their great enterprise to which I, who have followed the profession of arms since my childhood, now succeed. It is my purpose to treat you all without distinction as my hereditary vassals. If any of you object to be so treated, let him return to his province and take the consequences."
Date Masamune assumed the duty of replying to that very explicit statement. "There is none here," he said, "that is not grateful for the benevolence he has received at the hands of the Tokugawa. If there be such a thankless and disloyal person, and if he conceive treacherous designs, I, Masamune, will be the first to attack him and strike him down. The shogun need not move so much as one soldier." With this spirited reply all the assembled daimyo expressed their concurrence, and Iemitsu proceeded to distribute his father's legacies to the various barons and their vassals. Very soon after his accession he had to order the execution of his own brother, Tadanaga, and the banishment of Kato Tadahiro, son of the celebrated Kato Kiyomasa. The latter was punished on the ground that he sent away his family from Yedo during the time of mourning for the late shogun, Hidetada. He was deprived of his estate at Kumamoto in Higo and was exiled to Dewa province.
The punishment of these two barons is said to have been in the sequel of a device planned by Iemitsu and carried out by Doi Toshikatsu. The latter, being accused of a simulated crime, was sentenced to confinement in his mansion. Thence he addressed to all the daimyo a secret circular, urging them to revolt and undertaking to make Tadanaga shogun instead of Iemitsu. With two exceptions every baron to whose hands this circular came forwarded it to the Bakufu in Yedo. The exceptions were Tadanaga and Tadahiro, who consequently fell under the shogun's suspicion. Thereafter, it is related that some of the barons set themselves to deceive the Bakufu by various wiles. Thus, Maeda Toshinaga had recourse to the manoeuvre of allowing the hair in his nostrils to grow long, a practice which speedily earned for him the reputation of insanity, and Date Masamune conceived the device of carrying a sword with a wooden blade. The apprehensions of which such acts were indicative cannot be considered surprising in view of the severe discipline exercised by the Bakufu. Thus, during the shogunate of Hidetada, no less than forty changes are recorded to have been made among the feudatories, and in the time of Iemitsu there were thirty-five of such incidents. History relates that to be transferred from one fief to another, even without nominal loss of revenue, was regarded as a calamity of ten years' duration. All this was partly prompted by the Bakufu's policy of weakening the feudatories. To the same motive must be assigned constant orders for carrying out some costly public work.