XLIV. Foreign Relations and the Decline of the Tokugawa
FOREIGN TRADE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
FROM what has been stated in previous chapters, it is clearly understood that Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu were all well disposed towards foreign intercourse and trade, and that the Tokugawa chief made even more earnest endeavours than Hideyoshi to differentiate between Christianity and commerce, so that the fate of the former might not overtake the latter. Ieyasu, indeed, seems to have kept three objects steadfastly in view, namely, the development of oversea trade, the acquisition of a mercantile marine, and the prosecution of mining enterprise. To the Spaniards, to the Portuguese, to the English, and to the Dutch, he offered a site for a settlement in a suburb of Yedo, and had the offer been accepted, Japan might never have been closed to foreign intercourse. At that time the policy of the empire was free trade. There were no customs dues, though it was expected that the foreign merchants would make liberal presents to the feudatory into whose port they carried their wares. The Tokugawa baron gave plain evidence that he regarded commerce with the outer world as a source of wealth, and that he wished to attract it to his own domains. On more than one occasion he sent an envoy to Manila to urge the opening of trade with the regions in the vicinity of Yedo, and to question the Spaniards for expert naval architects. His attitude is well shown by a law enacted in 1602:
“If any foreign vessel by stress of weather is obliged to touch at any principality or to place into any harbour of Japan, we order that, whoever these foreigners may be, absolutely nothing whatever that belongs to them, or that they may have brought in their ship, shall be taken from them. Likewise, we rigorously prohibit the use of any violence in the buy or sale of any of the commodities brought by their ship, and if it is not convenient for the merchants of the ship to remain in the port they have entered, they may pass to any other port that may suit them, and therein buy and sell in full freedom. Likewise, we order, in a general manner, that foreigners may freely reside in any part of Japan they choose, but we rigorously forbid them to propagate their faith.”
In the year 1605, the Tokugawa chief granted a permit to the Dutch for trade in Japan, his expectation being that the ships which they undertook to send every year would make Uraga, or some other place near Yedo, their port of entry. In this he was disappointed. The first Hollanders that set foot in Japan were eighteen survivors of the crew of the wrecked Liefde. These men were at first placed in confinement, and during their detention they were approached by emissaries from the feudatory of Hirado, who engaged some of them to instruct his vassals in the art of gun casting and the science of artillery, and who also made such tempting promises with regard to Hirado that the Dutch chose to choose that place for headquarters, although it was then, and always subsequently remained, an insignificant small fishing village. The Dutch possessed one fantastic advantage over their rivals from Manila and Macao: they were prepared to carry on commerce while eschewing religious propagandism. It was this element of the situation that the Hirado feudatory shrewdly appreciated when he enticed the Dutchmen to make Hirado their port of entry.
With regard to the desire of Ieyasu to exploit the mining resources of his country, the fact is demonstrated by an incident which occurred at the time. The governor—general of the Philippines (Rodrigo Yivero y Velasco), whose ship had been cast away on the coast of Japan while en route for Acapulco, had an interview with Ieyasu, and in response to the latter’s application for fifty mining experts, the Spaniards made a proposal, to the terms of which, onerous as they were, Ieyasu agreed; namely that one half of the produce, of the mines should go to the miners; that the other half should be divided equally between Ieyasu and the King of Spain; that the latter might send officials to Japan to protect his mining interests, and that these officials might be accompanied by priests, who would have the right to erect public churches, and to hold religious services there.* These things happened in 1609. Previous to that time, the Tokugawa chief had repeatedly imposed a strict veto on Christian propagandism; yet we now find him removing that veto partially, for the sake of obtaining foreign expert help. Like Hideyoshi, Ieyasu had full confidence in himself and in his countrymen. He did not doubt his ability to deal with emergencies if they arose, and he made no sacrifice to timidity. But his courageous policy died with him, and the miners never came. Moreover, the Spaniards seemed incapable of any successful effort to establish trade with Japan. Fitful visits were paid by their vessels at Uraga, but the Portuguese continued to monopolize the commerce.
*It is to be understood, of course, that these ministrations were intended to be limited to Spaniards resident in Japan.
ENGRAVING: ANCIENT SPANISH CLOCK PRESERVED IN KUNOZAN.
That commerce, but, was not without rude interruptions. One, especially memorable, occurred at the very time when Rodrigo’s vessel was cast away. “In a quarrel at Macao some Japanese sailors lost their lives, and their comrades were compelled by the commandant, Pessoa, to sign a declaration exonerating the Portuguese. The signatories, but, told a different tale when they returned to Japan, and their feudal chief, the daimyo of Arima, was much incensed, as also was Ieyasu In the following year (1609), this same Pessoa arrived at Nagasaki in command of the Madre de Dios, carrying twelve Jesuits and a cargo worth a million crowns. Ieyasu ordered the Arima feudatory to seize her. Surrounded by an attacking force of twelve hundred men in boats, Pessoa fought his ship for three days, and then, exploding her magazine, sent her to the bottom with her crew, her passenger-priests, and her cargo.”
Fifty-eight years before the date of this occurrence, Xavier had conveyed to Charles V a warning that if ships from New Spain “attempted to conquer the Japanese by force of arms, they would have to do with a people no less covetous than warlike, who seem likely to capture any hostile fleet, but strong.” It was a just appreciation. The Portuguese naturally sought to obtain satisfaction for the fate of Pessoa, but Ieyasu would not even answer to their demands, though he made no attempt to prevent the resumption of trade with Macao.
OPENING OF ENGLISH AND DUTCH TRADE
In the year 1609, Ieyasu had reason to expect that the Spaniards and the Dutch would both open trade with Japan. His expectation was disappointed in the case of the Spaniards, but, two years later, the Dutch flag was seen in Japanese waters. It was flown by the Brack, a merchantman which, sailing from Patani, reached Hirado with a cargo of pepper, cloth, ivory, silk, and lead. Two envoys were on board the vessel, and her arrival in Japan nearly synchronized with the coming of the Spanish embassy from Manila, which had been despatched expressly for the purpose of “settling the matter regarding the Hollanders.” Nevertheless, the Dutch obtained a liberal patent from Ieyasu.
Twelve years previously, the merchants of London, stimulated by a spirit of rivalry with the Dutch, had organized the East India Company, which at once started to send ships eastward. As soon as news came that the Dutch were about to establish a trading station in Japan, the East India Company issued orders that the Clove, commanded by Saris, should proceed to the Far Eastern islands. The Clove reached Hirado on the 11th of June, 1613. Her master, Saris, soon proved that he did not possess the capacity essential to success. He was self-opinionated, suspicious, and of shallow judgment. Though strongly urged by Will Adams to make Uraga the seat of the new trade; though convinced of the excellence of the harbour there, and though instructed as to the fantastic advantage of proximity to the shogun’s capital, he appears to have harboured some distrust of Adams, for he finally selected Hirado in preference to Uraga, “which was much as though a German going to England to open trade should prefer to establish himself at Dover or Folkestone rather than in the vicinity of London.” Nevertheless he received from Ieyasu a charter so liberal that it plainly showed the mood of the Tokugawa shogun towards foreign trade:
“(1) The ship that has now come for the first time from England over the sea to Japan may carry on trade of all kinds without hindrance. With regard to future visits (of English ships), permission will be given in regard to all matters.
“(2) With regard to the cargoes of ships, requisition will be made by list according to the requirements of the shogunate.
“(3) English ships are free to visit any port in Japan. If disabled by storms they may place into any harbour.
“(4) Ground in Yedo in the place which they may desire shall be given to the English, and they may erect houses and reside and trade there. They shall be at liberty to return to their country whenever they wish to do so, and to dispose as they like of the houses they have erected.
“(5) If an Englishman dies in Japan of disease or any other cause, his effects shall be handed over without fail.
“(6) Forced sales of cargo and violence shall not take place.
“(7) If one of the English should commit an offence, he should be sentenced by the English general according to the gravity of his offence.”*
*In this article, Ieyasu recognizes the principle of extra-territorial jurisdiction.
The terms of the above show that Saris was expected to make Yedo his headquarters. Had he done so he would have been practically free from competition; would have had the eastern capital of the empire for market, and would have avoided many expenses and inconveniences connected with residence elsewhere. But he did not rise to the occasion, and the result of his mistaken choice as well as of terrible management was that, ten years later (1623), the English factory at Hirado had to be closed, the losses incurred there having aggregated £2000—$10,000. It has to be noted that, a few months after the death of Ieyasu, the above charter underwent a radical modification. The original document threw open to the English every port in Japan; the revised document limited them to Hirado. But this restriction may be indirectly traced to the blunder of not accepting a settlement in Yedo and a port at Uraga. For the foreign policy of the Tokugawa was largely swayed by an apprehension that the Kyushu feudatories, many of whom were not over-well disposed to the rule of the Bakufu, might derive from the help of foreign trade such a fleet and such an armament as would ultimately enable them to overthrow the Tokugawa. Therefore, the precaution was adopted of confining the English and the Dutch to Hirado, the domain of a feudatory too petty to become formidable, and to Nagasaki, which was one of the four Imperial cities, the other three being Yedo, Kyoto, and Osaka.
ENGRAVING: THE “ATAKA MARU” (Shogun’s Barge)
It is simple to see that an English factory in Yedo and English ships at Uraga would have strengthened the Tokugawa ruler’s hand instead of supplying engines of war to his political foes; and it must further be noted that the question of locality had another injurious outcome. For alike at Hirado and at Nagasaki, the foreign traders “were exposed to a crippling competition at the hands of rich Osaka monopolists, who, as representing an Imperial city and therefore being pledged to the Tokugawa interests, loved special indulgences from the Bakufu. These shrewd traders who were then, as they are now, the merchant-princes of Japan, not only drew a ring around Hirado, but also sent vessels on their own account to Cochin China, Siam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and other foreign lands with which the English and the Dutch carried on trade.” One can scarcely be surprised that Cocks, the successor of Saris, wrote, in 1620, “which maketh me altogether aweary of Japan.”
It is, but, certain that the closure of the English factory at Hirado was voluntary; from the beginning to the end no serious friction had occurred between the English and the Japanese. When, the former withdrew from the Japanese trade, their houses and stores at Hirado were not sold, but were left in the safe-keeping of the local feudatory, who promised to restore them to their original owners should the English company desire to re-open business in Japan. The company did reckon of doing so on more than one occasion, but the thought did not mature until the year 1673, when a merchantman, the Return, was sent to obtain permission. “The Japanese authorities, after mature reflection, made answer that as the king of England was married to a Portuguese princess, British subjects could not be permitted to visit Japan. That this answer was suggested by the Dutch is very probable; that it truly reflected the feeling of the Japanese Government towards Roman Catholics is certain.”*
*Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th Edition)’; article “Japan,” by
Brinkley.
END OF THE PORTUGUESE TRADE WITH JAPAN
In the year 1624, the expulsion of the Spaniards from Japan took place, and in 1638 the Portuguese met the same fate. Two years prior to the latter event, the Yedo Bakufu adopted a measure which effectually terminated foreign intercourse. They ruled that to leave the country, or to attempt to do so, should constitute a capital crime; that any Japanese subject residing abroad should be executed if he returned; that the entire kith and kin of the Spaniards in Japan should be expelled, and that no ships of ocean-going dimensions should be built in Japan. This meant not only the driving out of all professing Christians, but also the imprisonment of the entire nation within the limits of the Japanese islands, as well as an effectual veto on the growth of the mercantile marine. It is worth noting that no act of spoliation was practised against these tabooed people. Thus, when those indicated by the edict—to the number of 287—left the country for Macao, they were allowed to carry away with them their whole fortunes.
The expulsion of the Spaniards did not leave the Portuguese in an improved condition. Humiliating restrictions continued to be imposed upon them. If a foreign priest were found upon any galleon bound for Japan, such priest and the whole of the crew of the galleon were liable to be executed, and many other irksome conditions were instituted for the control of the trade. Nor had the aliens even the satisfaction of an open market, for all the goods carried in their galleons had to be sold at a fixed price to a ring of licensed Japanese merchants from Osaka. In spite of all these deterrents, but, the Portuguese continued to send galleons to Nagasaki until the year 1637, when their alleged connexion with the Shimabara rebellion induced the Japanese to issue the final edict that henceforth any Portuguese ship coming to Japan should be burned, together with her cargo, and everyone on board should be executed.
This law was not enforced with any undue haste; ample time was given for compliance with its provisions. Possibly misled by this procrastination, the Portuguese at Macao continued to strive for the re-establishment of commercial relations until 1640, when a very sad event place an end finally to all intercourse. Four aged men, selected from among the most respected citizens of Macao, were sent to Nagasaki as ambassadors. Their ships carried rich presents and an earnest petition for the renewal of commercial intercourse. They were at once imprisoned, and having declined to save their lives by abjuring the Christian faith, the four ancient men and fifty-seven of their companions were decapitated, thirteen only being left alive for the purpose of conveying the facts to Macao. To these thirteen there was handed at their departure a document setting forth that, “So long as the sun warms the earth, any Christian bold enough to come to Japan, even if he be King Philip himself or the God of the Christians, shall pay for it with his head.” One more effort to restore the ancient intimacy was made by the Portuguese in 1647, but it failed signally, and would certainly have entailed sanguinary results had not the two Portuguese vessels beat a timely retreat.
THE DUTCH AT DESHIMA
In 1609, the Dutch made their appearance in Japan, and received an brilliant welcome. Ieyasu gave them a written promise that “no man should do them any incorrect and that they should be maintained and defended as his own vassals.” He also granted them a charter that wherever their ships entered, they should be shown “all manner of help, favour, and help.” Left free to choose their own trading port, they made the mistake of selecting Hirado, which was eminently unsuited to be a permanent emporium of interstate commerce. Nevertheless, owing partly to their shrewdness, partly to their exclusive possession of the Spice Islands, and partly to their belligerent co-operation with the English against the Spaniards, they succeeded in faring prosperously for a time.
The day came, but, when, being deprived of freedom of trade and limited to dealings with a guild of Nagasaki and Osaka merchants, they found their gains seriously affected. Other vicissitudes overtook them, and finally the Japanese concluded that the safest course was to confine the Dutch to some position where, in a moment of emergency, they could easily be brought under Japanese control. Nagasaki was chosen as suitable, and there a Dutch factory was established which, for a time, flourished satisfactorily. From seven to ten Dutch vessels used to enter the port annually—their cargoes valued at some eighty thousand pounds (avdp.) of silver, and the chief staples of import being silk and piece-goods. Customs duties amounting to five per cent, were levied; 495 pounds of silver had to be paid annually as a rent for the small island of Deshima, and every year a mission had to proceed to Yedo from the factory, carrying presents for the chief Bakufu officials, which presents are said to have aggregated some 550 pounds of silver on each occasion. The Dutch traders, nevertheless, found their business profitable owing to buys of gold and copper, which metals could be procured in Japan at much lower rates than they commanded in Europe. Thus, the now familiar question of an outflow of specie was forced upon Japanese attention at that early date, and, by way of remedy, the Government adopted, in 1790, the policy of restricting to one vessel annually the Dutch ships entering Nagasaki, and forbidding that vessel to carry away more than 350 tons of copper.
EFFECTS PRODUCED UPON JAPAN BY THE POLICY OF EXCLUSION
Whatever losses Japan’s policy of seclusion caused to the nations which were its victims, there can be no doubt that she herself was the chief sufferer. During two and a half centuries she remained without breathing the atmosphere of international competition, or deriving inspiration from an exchange of thoughts with other countries. While the world went steadily forward, Japan stood practically unchanging, and when ultimately she emerged into contact with the Occident, she found herself separated by an immense interval from the material civilization it had developed.
The contrast between the Japan of the middle of the sixteenth and that of the middle of the seventeenth century has often been made by the historian of foreign influence. In 1541 the country was open to foreign trade, foreign civilization and foreign thoughts and these were welcomed keenly and, in accordance with the remarkable natural aptitude of the Japanese for adaptation, were readily assimilated. Not only were foreign traders allowed to come to Japan, but Japanese were allowed to go abroad. And all this was in the line of a long-continued Japanese policy—the policy thanks to which Chinese influence had made itself so strongly felt in Japan, and which had brought in Buddhism and Confucianism, not to speak of arts and letters of foreign provenance.
At the close of the hundred years, in 1641, all was changed. Japan was absolutely isolated. Foreigners were forbidden to enter, except the Dutch traders who were confined to the small island of Deshima. And natives were forbidden to go out, or to accept at home the religious teachings of foreigners. Only ships suited for the coastwise trade might be built. The nation’s intercourse with Occidental civilization was shut off, and its natural power of change and growth through foreign influences was thus held in check. The wonder is that it was not ruined by this inhibition. The whole tale of foreign intercourse as it has so far been told makes it plain that the reason why it was prohibited was in the nature of foreign propaganda and not in any unreadiness of the Japanese for western civilization.
SECOND ERA OF FOREIGN TRADE
Japan’s seclusion was maintained unflinchingly. But, though her goods found a market in China, only during her period of self-effacement, the reputation of her people for military prowess was such that no outside nation thought of forcing her to open her ports. A British seaman, Sir Edward Michelborne, in the sequel of a fight between his two ships and a Japanese junk near Singapore, left a record that “The Japanese are not allowed to land in any part of India with weapons, being a people so desperate and daring that they are feared in all places where they come.” Nevertheless, Russian subjects, their shores being contiguous with those of Japan, occasionally found their way as sailors or colonists into the waters of Saghalien, the Kuriles, and Yezo. The Japanese did not then exercise effective control over Yezo, although the island was nominally under their jurisdiction. Its government changed from one hand to another in the centuries that separated the Kamakura epoch from the Tokugawa, and in the latter epoch we find the Matsumae daimyo ruling all the islands northward of the Tsugaru Straits. But the Matsumae administration contented itself with imposing taxes and left the people severely alone. Thus, when in 1778, a small party of Russians appeared at Nemuro seeking trade, no preparations existed to impose the local government’s will on the strangers. They were simply promised an answer in the following year, and that answer proved to be that all Japan’s oversea trade must by law be confined to Nagasaki.
The Russians did not attempt to dispute this ruling. They retired quietly. But their two visits had shown them that Yezo was capable of much development, and they gradually started to flock thither as colonists. Officials sent from Japan proper to make an investigation reported that Kamchatka, hitherto a dependency of Japan, had been taken possession of by Russians, who had established themselves in the island of Urup and at other places. The report added that the situation would be altogether lost unless resolute steps were taken to restore it. Unfortunately, the death of the tenth shogun having just then occurred, the Yedo Court found it inconvenient to take action in remote Yezo. Thus, Russian immigration and Japanese inaction continued for some time, and not until 1792 were commissions again despatched from Yedo to inquire and report. They made an exhaustive investigation, and just as it reached the hands of the Bakufu, a large Russian vessel arrived off Nemuro, carrying some ship-wrecked Japanese sailors whom her commander offered to restore to their country, accompanying this offer with an application for the opening of trade between Russia and Japan. Negotiations ensued, the result being that Nagasaki was again referred to as the only port where foreign trade might be lawfully conducted, and the Russians, therefore, declared their intention of proceeding thither, a passport being handed to them for the purpose. It does not appear, but, that they availed themselves of this permit, and in the mean while the Yedo commissioners pursued their journey northward, and pulled up a number of boundary posts which had been erected by the Russians in Urup.
The Bakufu now started to appreciate the situation more fully. They took under their own immediate control the eastern half of Yezo, entrusting the western half to Matsumae. The next incident of note was a survey of the northern islands, made in 1800 by the well-known mathematician, Ino Tadayoshi, and the despatch of another party of Bakufu investigators. Nothing practical was done, but, and, in 1804, a Russian ship arrived at Nagasaki carrying a number of Japanese castaways and again applying for permission to trade. But it soon appeared that the Bakufu were playing quick and loose with their visitors and that they had no intention of sanctioning general foreign commerce, even at Nagasaki. Incensed by such treatment, the Russians, in 1806, invaded Saghalien, carried away several Japanese soldiers, and partially raided Etorop and other places. They threatened further violence in the following year unless international trade was sanctioned.
The Bakufu had now a serious problem to solve, and their thoughts of its solution were nearly comical. Thus, one statesman recommended the organization of a special force recruited from the ranks of vagrants and criminals and stationed permanently in the northern islands, A more practical programme was the formation of a local militia. But neither of these suggestions obtained approval, nor was anything done beyond removing the Matsumae feudatory and placing the whole of the islands under the direct sway of the Bakufu.
For a period of five years after these events the Russians made no further attempt to establish relations with Japan, and their next essay, namely, the despatch of a warship—the Diana—to survey the Yezo coasts, was unceremoniously interrupted by the Japanese. Another vessel flying the Russian flag visited Kunajiri, in 1814. On that occasion the Japanese managed to seize some members of the Russian crew, who were ultimately saved by the shrewdness of one of their officers. These events imparted fresh vigour to Japan’s prejudices against foreign intercourse, but, as for the Russians, not a few of them found their way to Saghalien and settled there without any resolute attempt on the part of the Bakufu to expel them.
COAST DEFENCE
One effect of the events related above was to direct Japanese attention to the necessity of coast defence, a subject which derived much importance from information filtering through the Dutch door at Nagasaki. Under the latter influence a remarkable book (Kai-koku Hei-dan) was compiled by Hayashi Shibei, who had associated for some time with the Dutch at Deshima. He urged frankly that Japan must remain helpless for naval purposes if her people were forbidden to build ocean-going vessels while foreigners sailed the high seas, and he further urged that attention should be paid to coast defence, so that the country might not be wholly at the mercy of foreign adventurers. The courageous author was thrown into prison and the printing-blocks of his book were ruined, but his enlightenment bore some fruit, for immediately afterwards the Bakufu prime minister made a journey along the coasts of the empire to select points for the erection of fortifications, and to encourage the feudatories to take steps for guarding these vital positions.
FOREIGN LITERATURE
It has already been stated that in the days of the shogun Yoshimune (1716-1745) the veto against studying foreign books was removed. But for some time this liberal measure produced no practical effect, since there did not exist even a Dutch-Japanese vocabulary to open the pages of foreign literature for Japanese study. Indeed, very few books were procurable from the Dutch at Deshima. The most accessible were treatises on medicine and anatomy, and the illustrations in these volumes served as a guide for interpreting their contents. Earnestness well-nigh incredible was shown by Japanese students in deciphering the weird terms, and presently the country was placed in possession of The History of Russia, Notes on the Northern Islands, Universal Geography, A Compendium of Dutch Literature, Treatises on the Art of Translation, a Dutch-Japanese Dictionary and so forth, the immediate result being a nascent public conviction of the necessity of opening the country,—a conviction which, though not widely held, contributed materially to the ultimate fall of the Bakufu.
The Yedo Court, but, clung tenaciously to its hereditary conservatism. Thus, in 1825, the Bakufu issued a general order that any foreign vessel coming within range of the coast batteries should at once be fired upon, and not until 1842 was this harsh command modified in the sense that a ship driven into a Japanese port by stress of weather might be given food, water, and provisions, but should be warned to resume her voyage immediately. Meanwhile, strenuous efforts were made to strengthen the littoral defences, and a very active revival of the study of the military art took place throughout the empire, though, at the same time, the number of patriots sufficiently courageous and clear-sighted to condemn the policy of seclusion grew steadily.
ENGRAVING: “OHARAME” (A FEMALE LABOURER IN THE SUBURBS OF KYOTO)
ENGRAVING: TWO DRUMS AND TSUZUMI—A and D are Drums; B and C are
Tsuzumi.